By Cengiz K. Firat
The planned meeting of the Turkish–Greek High-Level Cooperation Council (HLC) in Ankara on February 11 comes when the calm in relations between Ankara and Athens conceals numerous fragilities. That’s just one reason why the meeting between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis is unlikely to produce a breakthrough. Rather, the meeting aims to keep communication channels open while both sides pursue sharply divergent agendas in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean.
The HLC is not a forum for resolving core sovereignty disputes. Instead, it functions to manage tensions, prevent military incidents, and compartmentalize disagreements. It brings together ministers from both governments across a wide range of fields—foreign affairs, defense, energy, transport, trade, and migration—with the aim of maintaining a workable relationship even amid rivalry.
Yet behind this diplomatic architecture lies a deep strategic contest that shapes how each capital approaches the meeting.
ANKARA’S PERSPECTIVE
From Turkey’s perspective, recent Greek policy represents a dangerous drift away from balance toward encirclement. According to Ankara, Athens is not merely modernizing its military but pursuing a shift in the regional power structure that challenges Turkish security interests.
Greece’s extensive rearmament — new frigates, F-35s, Rafale fighter jets, upgraded F-16s, advanced air defense systems, and naval modernization — is seen in Ankara as an effort to build military superiority in the Aegean. That’s why this buildup alters the status quo and increases the risk of miscalculation—from Turkey’s perspective.
What further unsettles Ankara is Greece’s growing network of strategic partnerships—with France, the United States, Israel, and India. Turkey interprets these alignments as an attempt to isolate it diplomatically and constrain its maritime claims. In particular, Ankara views Greek cooperation with Israel and participation in Eastern Mediterranean energy-security initiatives as part of an architecture that excludes Turkey from regional decision-making.
In response, Turkey has recently reasserted its positions through Navtex notifications and renewed emphasis on the demilitarized status of certain Aegean islands. Turkish defense officials insist that their actions are aimed at protecting navigation and maritime rights — not at sabotaging dialogue.
At the same time, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has signaled a willingness to focus talks on maritime delimitation, rather than reopening the entire spectrum of disputes. This is seen as a tactical adjustment — possibly influenced by U.S. interest in regional stability and energy access — rather than a fundamental change.
Ankara also appears prepared to offer limited gestures, such as steps toward easing restrictions related to the Halki (Heybeliada) Theological School, as a confidence-building measure toward Greece and the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, without addressing broader political demands. I would presume Erdoğan to ask for return gestures concerning the rights of the Turks in Western Thrace.
Recent reports that Greece is no longer extending residence permits for members of the movement led by the Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen—whom Turkey considers terrorists in connection with the July 15 coup attempt—are being interpreted in Ankara as a positive signal ahead of Mitsotakis’s visit.
THE GREEK READING
From Athens’ standpoint, Turkey’s renewed aerial engagements, expansive Navtex claims, and public warnings about Greek “unilateral actions” are evidence that Ankara remains committed to maximalist maritime positions incompatible with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which Turkey does not recognize.
Greece insists that the only subject for negotiation is the delimitation of the continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), potentially to be settled at the International Court of Justice. Athens rejects Turkey’s demands regarding island demilitarization, airspace, and licensing jurisdiction as unacceptable infringements on Greek sovereignty.
Greek officials argue their military buildup is a matter of deterrence, saying it’s a direct response to Turkey’s assertive posture in the Aegean.
At the same time, Greece is accelerating hydrocarbon exploration with ExxonMobil and Chevron in the Ionian Sea and south of Crete, and positioning itself as a key node in the Vertical Energy Corridor, linking the Eastern Mediterranean to Southeast and Central Europe. For Athens, maintaining manageable relations with Ankara is essential to advancing these projects without constant crisis.
However, Greece is also wary of U.S. involvement — especially under President Donald Trump — fearing that Washington might push for a rapid compromise that sidelines international law in favor of energy and security expediency.
CYPRUS: UNRESOLVED BACKDROP
No discussion of Turkish–Greek relations is complete without Cyprus.
Negotiations remain frozen, with Ankara supporting a two-state vision and Athens backing a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation under UN parameters. The island continues to cast a long shadow over bilateral relations, limiting how far rapprochement can realistically go.
The HLC is unlikely to produce movement on Cyprus, but both sides appear determined not to let it derail broader engagement.
WHAT TO EXPECT — AND WHAT NOT TO
Expectations are deliberately modest.
At best, the meeting may lead to a reaffirmation of de-escalation mechanisms in the Aegean, along with the continuation of technical talks on maritime issues. Some limited confidence-building measures could emerge in areas such as search-and-rescue, disaster response, or maritime safety. Symbolic gestures related to the Halki Theological School or the rights of the Turks of Western Thrace may also be considered—steps that would improve the overall atmosphere without altering the underlying strategic landscape.
What remains unlikely, however, is any agreement on core disputes such as demilitarization claims, airspace disputes, or the establishment of a clear timetable for legal arbitration.
POSSIBLE AREAS OF CONVERGENCE
Despite deep mistrust, there are narrow spaces where agreement may still be possible.
On incident prevention in the Aegean, clearer rules of engagement and improved communication channels could help reduce the risk of accidental escalation. In the energy domain, a pragmatic approach to coexistence—even without a legal settlement—might see both sides avoid provocative, overlapping activities in contested zones. Cooperation on migration remains another realistic avenue, as practical coordination benefits both governments. Likewise, economic normalization through trade, tourism, and transport links continues to offer mutual gains without significant political risk.
While none of these steps would resolve the underlying disputes, they could help keep the HLC process alive and generate momentum for future meetings.
A CAUTIOUS PATH FORWARD
The February 11 meeting between President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Mitsotakis is less about reconciliation than about managing coexistence amid rivalry. Ankara seeks recognition of its maritime concerns and security sensitivities, while Athens seeks stability without legitimizing what it considers illegal claims.
Both sides have reasons to avoid a crisis. If the HLC preserves dialogue, prevents escalation, and produces even limited confidence-building measures, it will have achieved its purpose.
It would also be safe to assume that neither side is ready to escalate tensions to a level where President Trump might be tempted to step in and “solve another crisis.” Especially when we bear in mind that there seems to be a lot of natural resources to tap into in the Eastern Mediterranean.
*Cengiz K. Fırat (b. 1970) is a retired Turkish ambassador. He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1993 and retired from diplomatic service in 2024. Throughout his career, he served in several key Turkish missions abroad, including the EU Delegation in Brussels, the Embassy in Algiers, the OECD Delegation in Paris, and the Embassy in Stockholm. He later served as ambassador to Kyrgyzstan and Poland.
